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Below the Belt? Territory and Development in China’s
International Rise
Giles Mohan
ABSTRACT
China’s internationalization has been heralded by some as a new era of
South–South cooperation. Yet such framings of development are pitched at
an abstract space of the ‘global South’ which conceals more than it reveals.
With some theory moving towards ontologies of ‘global development’, we
need to capture both the connectedness and the local specificity of increas-
ingly diffuse processes. This article sets out a more fine-grained understand-
ing of how political territories and processes are imagined and produced
by and through China’s internationalization, focusing on infrastructure as a
‘technology’ of territorialization. Much of the focus on China’s internation-
alization has been on state-to-state relations, but this obscures the ‘omni-
channel politics’ that China practises. Using a critical literature review and
illustrative case study, this article develops the idea of omni-channel pol-
itics to posit a view of ‘twisted’ territories in which political processes and
development outcomes are more complex and contingent.
INTRODUCTION: BEYOND MONOLITHIC SPATIALITIES
The implications of China’s international rise for the political economy of
development are profound, but our analytical tools are relatively blunt, par-
ticularly the spatial lenses we use. As others have noted, ‘China’ is often
treated as homogeneous (Klinger and Muldavin, 2019) which in turn pro-
duces stark assessments of China’s development impact as either ‘good’
or ‘bad’ (Obi, 2019). This homogenizing tendency is compounded when
we consider where China engages, with broad-brush analysis of things like
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‘China–Africa’ relations that treat ‘Africa’ as a single entity (Chan, 2008).
Allied to this is the broader framing of the world in terms of ‘North’ and
‘South’ (Horner and Hulme, 2019) which does not capture China’s ambiva-
lent position within development processes, nor the unfolding complexity
of the connectedness that its rise engenders. Thus, these polarized and par-
tial debates about China’s rise are rarely helpful in illuminating the types of
changes we are actually seeing in development processes and outcomes. At
one level, then, this article seeks to develop the recent arguments made for
a move to ‘global development’ (Horner, 2020) as a way of capturing this
unfolding complexity.
The most visible embodiment of China’s assertive international role is
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which was mooted in 2013 and has
subsequently morphed into a multi-stranded geopolitical and geo-economic
project (Flint and Zhu, 2019). China’s international rise is also evolving
with the BRI and other initiatives moving the country’s engagement beyond
state-to-state deals towards what Nederveen Pieterse (2018) characterizes as
‘omni-channel politics’. For good reasons, much analysis of China’s engage-
ment with the rest of the world has focused on inter-state relations (see, e.g.,
Burgos and Ear, 2010; Carmody et al., 2009). However, this state-centrism
has obscured other political scales, actors and processes. In the context of
the emergent BRI, the political processes operating alongside, above and
below the belt — hence my title — serve to buttress China’s influence as a
development actor.
This article is concerned with why and, particularly, how China is prac-
tising its omni-channel politics in light of the need to embrace the more
‘nuanced maps’ (Sidaway, 2012: 56) of development outlined above. The
prefix of ‘omni-’ to mean ‘all’ is broken down into ‘multi-channels’ (Ned-
erveen Pieterse, 2018: 71–72): working within existing global institutions,
seeking to reform the same institutions, and creating new institutions and
frameworks. This framing of what China is doing is helpful but tends to be
descriptive — organizations and what they do — and pivots around a state-
centrism. As a version of multi-level governance, omni-channel politics fails
to capture the various ways in which the Chinese state is fragmenting (Jones
and Zeng, 2019), how politics enrols multiple actors (Hameiri et al., 2019),
how specific elites shape state actions (Klinger and Muldavin, 2019), and
how politics is relational and shaped by other actors beyond China (Mohan
and Lampert, 2013). While omni- or multi-channel politics begins to cap-
ture the emerging complexity of China’s international engagement, it fails
to account for these underlying processes and how they are realized through
more entangled — and potentially contradictory — spatialities of power.
It is here that theories of territory can add value for, as Uitermark (2015:
1) notes, considering territory ‘forces analysts to consider the geographical
foundations of politics as well as the particulars of governance’.
This article argues for a more spatially nuanced understanding of China’s
rise using ideas of territory. At its most general, territory — as I examine
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below — refers to ‘techniques for measuring and controlling space’ (Woon,
2019: 115) and is mainly a product of the Westphalian state system. Much
of the literature on China’s internationalization, including the idea of ‘omni-
channel politics’, implies Chinese actors and institutions driving these en-
gagements in pursuit of particular interests. In this way the Chinese state
rationally ‘extends’ its reach in multiple ways. Recent framings of territory
move us beyond this by focusing on ‘territorial systems’ that ‘emerge from
the interaction of multiple actors with different capabilities, incentives, and
design strategies, and at different levels of analysis, or scales’ (Atzili and
Kadercan, 2017: 121). Additionally, I focus on the technologies of terri-
tory; those ‘material tools used to make territory real’ (Branch, 2017: 137).
Much is made of cartography as a territorial technology, but for China’s
internationalization I am concerned with infrastructures as technologies of
territorialization.
The questions I want to address are, first, what forms of territory does
China create through its internationalization? And, second, what role does
infrastructure play in materializing these territories? Before addressing these
questions, I outline the ways in which current spatial framings of develop-
ment are inadequate to comprehend China’s rise — a debate that Devel-
opment and Change has championed (Fischer, 2019; Horner and Hulme,
2019). The arguments presented here are based on reflections across a ser-
ies of projects, most of which have focused on China’s engagement with a
range of African countries. I begin by reviewing the literature on develop-
ment and scale; while I agree that we need to retain development studies’
focus on the political economy of an increasingly globalized capitalism, this
has to move beyond some of the established spatial framings. Next, I review
the literature on territory and argue that we need a dynamic view of territor-
ies as folded yet largely rooted in capitalist logics. From there, I assess how
multiple internationalization processes play out, and the role of Chinese-
backed infrastructure projects in them. Finally, I outline a short case study
from Ghana which demonstrates the complex territorialization at play, be-
fore concluding.
THE SPATIAL LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
In thinking through the more complex territorialization of China’s rise we
need to move beyond existing spatial framings of development. In this sec-
tion I outline the limitations of these current spatialities as a way to ad-
dress alternative territorial framings. Development studies has been de-
fined by a range of spatial analytical scales. At its heart is a methodolog-
ical nationalism that treats the nation state as the primary unit of analysis
(Currie-Alder, 2016). In the context of the wave of post-war decoloniza-
tion this framing made sense since the endeavour was to stimulate devel-
opment to reduce both within and between country inequalities (Fischer,
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2019). In cruder, and ideologically loaded, versions of modernization the-
ory, countries were often portrayed on a continuum whereby those ‘lagging’
could be engineered to ‘catch up’ with ‘advanced’ countries. In the con-
text of China, Klinger and Muldavin (2019) note that assuming the coun-
try to be coherent and monolithic serves various ideological ends rooted in
Cold War sensibilities around threat and the ‘other’, though they argue that
China also projects itself as a unified whole that in turn conceals domestic
disparities.
Beyond methodological nationalism, international development is built
on an aggregation of binary scales or ‘meta-geographical demarcations’ in
Sidaway’s (2007: 336) terms, which Klinger and Muldavin (2019) argue are
‘outmoded’. Categories such as ‘developed/developing’, ‘first/third world’
or ‘global North/South’ all attempt to capture something of the global in-
equality that development studies seeks to ameliorate. While such binaries
have an enduring role (Grovogui, 2011), because they insist that power and
wealth are not evenly distributed and that proclamations about the ending of
US hegemony are premature, they can also obscure. One argument around
their inadequacy is empirical because data suggest a growing differentia-
tion within countries such that both development and under-development
co-exist within states the world over, rather than the latter being located pri-
marily in the developing world (Horner and Hulme, 2019). Allied to this
is awareness of planetary ecology that renders borders irrelevant, particu-
larly with respect to climate change (Horner, 2020). Such recognitions are
used to argue for the idea of ‘global development’ that untethers develop-
ment processes from particular places and simultaneously urges analysis
at a ‘smaller spatial scale’ (Horner and Hulme, 2019: 369). Similarly, Co-
maroff and Comaroff (2012: 127) point out that ‘there is much South in
the North, much North in the South, and more of both to come in the fu-
ture’; the first point refers to the precarity experienced in the global South
that is increasingly being experienced in the global North, though clearly
not something to celebrate (see also Bratman, 2011). However, as Arsel and
Dasgupta (2015) rightly observe, the mere existence of Third World-like
conditions in a given locality does not help us to explain such situations
analytically.
Another argument against spatial binaries is more theoretical insofar as
spatial categories are seen as forms of governmentality that need to be chal-
lenged in order to open space for alternatives. Since much development the-
ory relies on broadly ‘North–South’ framings, I have struggled to use it
to discuss China’s international engagements. Raghuram et al. (2014: 120)
capture this tension well: ‘the vectors of power… have prioritized the global
South/North distinction…. The dynamism and diversity of the global South,
especially its manifestation in what has come to be known as Rising Asia,
ruffles commonly accepted spatialities’. This presence of Asia complicates
— ‘ruffles’ in their terms — the accepted binaries and power relations of
knowledge production where the critique has focused on the colonizer as
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Western imperialist. China is simultaneously ‘Southern’, ‘Northern’ and
neither. China plays up its history of being colonized in certain instances,
often as part of the wider discourse of ‘South–South’ development coop-
eration (Mohan, 2016). Grovogui (2011) discusses ‘South–South’ relation-
ships as a form of ‘lateralism’ in which ‘moral equivalences’ exist between
nations. He argues ‘Such equivalences symbolically suspend asymmetries
among the parties in order to enable desired relationships and effects’ (ibid.:
182). At the same time China projects its growing power to position other
developing countries as suppliers of raw materials, much as Western powers
have done for centuries. This mixing unsettles categories which infuse our
work — things like ‘Chinese’ capitalism or ‘African’ agency. This unset-
tling also prevents us from neatly and pejoratively linking spaces to actions
— West = good, China = bad, or vice versa — links that pervade public
discourse around contemporary globalization.
The move towards global development should not be used to abandon
the particular in the face of a new universal condition — we are all (un-
der)developed now. Rather, the task is to hold in tension the general and the
particular. As Horner (2020: 427) notes ‘paying attention to geographical
variation in development challenges is a must in order the challenge both
flat-world claims and one-size-fits-all, universal solutions’. Hart’s (2018)
framing helps chart such directions by focusing on ‘spatio-historical speci-
ficities as well as interconnections and mutually constitutive processes’
(ibid.: 373). If we unpick China’s development processes through new con-
nections and partially decentre the West, then we need to think about scale
and politics in equally complex ways. As China internationalizes, we see
the creation and narration of new territorial forms as befits a power that is
entering a global order which, on the one hand, may be seeing the wan-
ing of US hegemony (Fischer, 2015) but, on the other hand, is fragment-
ing into multiple power centres. I now turn to these questions of politics
and space.
TERRITORIES, NETWORKS AND CAPITALISM
In terms of China’s growing international relationships, much of the focus
has been on inter-state relations, but this has obscured other political scales
and more complex spatially embedded processes. Here I examine the ways
in which territory has been conceptualized and how it may be transform-
ing. Broadly speaking we have witnessed shifts from seeing territory as a
bounded and state-centred control of space towards a more complex articu-
lation of bounded spaces and fluid, cross-cutting networks. Latterly this de-
and re-territorialization has posited more ‘twisted’ territories in which a
multiplicity of actors (notably, but not exclusively, global firms) co-exist
in complex spatial arrangements, even as they are constrained by the ‘stick-
iness’ of pre-existing territories.
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Territory and Territorialization
Territory and territorialization are a subset of wider processes regarding
the control of space for securing particular interests (Jessop, 2016; Sassen,
2013). While the nation state has become the dominant mode of terri-
tory under modernity (Elden, 2013), it is by no means the only important
form; moreover, other socio-spatial orders prevailed in pre-modern times.
While International Relations theory deals with nation states as the terri-
torial building blocks of the global system, it has done so relatively unre-
flexively and it has been human geographers that have problematized and
theorized territory (Atzili and Kadercan, 2017).
Human geographer Sack’s (1983) attempt at an all-encompassing theory
of territory was ‘neutral’ in that it posited how territory in general functions,
but he concedes that it can be linked to different theories of power and pol-
itical economy. For Sack, territory is essentially a form of enforcement or
control that involves organizing and classifying by area, and the construc-
tion of borders to communicate this classification, as well as the enforce-
ment of these borders. Agnew’s use of territoriality echoes Sack’s in that
‘[t]erritoriality is the strategic use of territory in either the organization and
exercise of power, legitimate or otherwise, over blocs of space or the organi-
zation of people and things into discrete areas through the use of boundaries’
(Agnew, 2011: 2589). In these processes of bordering, boundaries can be
both physical (walls, demilitarized zones, gated communities, immigration
controls, etc.) and symbolic (national identity, terra nullius, etc.) such that
the representational construction of territory is significant (Elden, 2013) for
creating exclusions and, most importantly, instituting property rights (Mur-
phy, 2013).
Territory/Network
The idea of territory assumes bounding and closure, but this closure is
problematic, because territories are increasingly de-centred by flows and
networks. Territory is most commonly seen as relating to the nation state
(Agnew, 2011; Uitermark, 2015) which implies a ‘top-down’ political strat-
egy centred on a monarch or powerful political bloc. In contrast to state-
based territorial fixity, networks are diffuse and open up ‘the possibility of
resolutions of a more contingent, open character than those imposed from
above’ (Cox, 2013: 48), although ‘[t]erritories and networks exist relation-
ally rather than mutually exclusively’ (Agnew, 2011: 2589). In addressing
similar issues, Sassen (2013, 2018) posits emergent forms of territory which
break down into two main types. The first includes non-national jurisdic-
tions inside the state’s territorial jurisdiction, but often only enrolling parts
of these national territories. The second is types of bordered spaces that
cut across the traditional inter-state borders, either through conventional
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transport linkages or digitally. For Sassen (2018: 7), these ‘bordering dy-
namics are partly formalized, partly emergent, and partly not necessarily
meant to be formalized nor to be particularly visible’. The metaphors move
from ‘nested’ scales seen in theories of multi-level governance to twisted,
messy or tangled geographies (Jessop, 2016).
Cox (2013) argues that network theories have authority, because we can-
not deny that more disembodied connections are proliferating under glo-
balization. He goes on to argue that these theories are largely descriptive
and do not explain the flows and connections as having any underlying
logic linked, in his case, to capitalist expansion. Cox maintains that cap-
italist accumulation needs ‘spatial fixes’ (Harvey, 1982) which necessar-
ily require the fixity of some territories that the network theorists have at-
tacked. Production requires immobile facilities and transportation infras-
tructures (Ougaard, 2018), while much economic activity is regionally or-
ganized due to post-Fordist production logics. Nation states grant access to
transnational capital while also controlling and containing the contradictions
of this accumulation. It is, in part, these imperatives which explain the ‘re-
markable tenacity’ of the modern state system (Murphy, 2013: 1214). From
the point of view of analysing territory, Harvey (1996: 53) notes: ‘Processes
do not operate in but actively construct space and time and in so doing de-
fine distinctive scales for their development’ (original emphasis). The key
is to understand the processes of connection and how they construct spa-
tial scale as opposed to starting with those scalar units. As such, Hart urges
us to start ‘with what seem to be important processes and practices rather
than with any sort of bounded unit — be it nation, city, village, or what-
ever — and engaging in an initial round of abstraction or theorizing’ (Hart,
2018: 389, original emphasis). The emphasis on processes and practices
also broadens the perspective away from only the logics of capitalist expan-
sion that Cox (2013) focuses on, to look at other, potentially non-capitalist,
logics.
The Technologies of Territory
For an analysis of China’s internationalization, I am concerned with prac-
tices and processes, but equally with the technologies of territory. Branch
(2017) argues that territory as an institutional form requires the coming to-
gether of ideas, practices and technologies. Ideas about such things as the
authority of the state have long been analysed by the social sciences, while
practices — notably demarcation of borders — have also been analysed in
some detail. Indeed, the earlier discussion of China’s omni-channel politics
largely focuses on the organizations and what they practise. The third ele-
ment of Branch’s framework is the technologies of territory, which ‘includes
the tools needed (or perceived to be needed) to implement territorial prac-
tices, as well as tools that are demanded, or given new meanings and uses,
8 Giles Mohan
by territorial ideas’ (ibid.: 137). Technologies are often implicitly lumped
into discussions of practices, but technologies such as mapping or surveil-
lance methods are the manifestations of practices. Infrastructures, such as
roads, ports or ICT networks, are part of the dynamics which both facilitate
bordering but also enable the more complex forms of folded territories that
Sassen (2018) evokes.
More recently those studying infrastructure have focused on the ways in
which infrastructure plays into state-building processes (Harvey and Knox,
2012). Here, infrastructure can be a means of spreading the state’s reach
across its territory in highly visible ways — such as roads — or of con-
necting contiguous territories into new territorial forms; indeed, the BRI is
an ‘imagined’ territory that is being brought into being through the con-
struction of transport infrastructure (Grant, 2018; Lin et al., 2019). In these
accounts state power is very much central to infrastructure systems. But
power is also entwined in infrastructures through the everyday interactions
that ‘users’ have with them. Such interactions may defy the original goals of
such infrastructure — for example, where the internet is used for subversion
— or be purposive acts of resistance, such as sabotage of power lines. These
everyday interactions disrupt framings of infrastructure as ‘standardized’
(Wiig and Silver, 2019). Wiig and Silver employ the concept of standardiza-
tion to argue that for infrastructure to function it has to interface with other
systems across space. Spatially, these connections break down into corridors
(e.g. transport routes, pipelines) and nodes (e.g. ports, cities), which paral-
lels the discussions of territory as both fixed and networked. Wiig and Silver
argue that peopling studies of infrastructure pushes us toward its ‘dynamic
material and spatial (re)configuration’ (ibid.: 916) and the multiple embed-
ded relations and processes that constitute spatially diffuse infrastructure
networks.
China’s Internationalization and the ‘Infrastructure Push’
The need for China to look beyond its borders for sources of energy and
other natural resources resulted in the ‘Going Out’ strategy from the late
1990s, whereby China encouraged outward investment and international
trade (Ayers, 2013; Chalmers and Mocker, 2017). As a spatial fix it was,
in part, necessary in sectors where the Chinese market was relatively sat-
urated or where domestic sources of energy were diminishing (Downs,
2011). This internationalization strategy was enabled by huge foreign ex-
change reserves and was given a boost during the global financial crisis
when Western sources of credit declined while Chinese banks were rel-
atively untouched. As such the 2008–11 period saw something of an in-
ternational spending spree by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in-
vesting in resources and/or infrastructure projects. More recently, this out-
ward investment has begun to slow and its direction has shifted somewhat
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towards more advanced economies and relatively less into resource extrac-
tion (OECD, 2018).
As noted, the term ‘omni-channel politics’ describes how China is seek-
ing to spread its influence. Geopolitically, we are seeing two linked moves
— one is to seek integration into the global order while the other is to nudge
things in a new direction that serves China’s ends (Cai, 2018; Zhou and
Esteban, 2018). As others have argued, China has engaged in creating new
multilateral organizations as well as working to boost its influence in ex-
isting ones (Alimov, 2018; Cai, 2018; King and Du, 2018; Taylor, 2012).
Again, such moves are seen by some to challenge (Western) spheres of in-
fluence. Indeed, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the
BRICS’ New Development Bank were partly about frustration with the lack
of reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions, while Japan responded to the
creation of the AIIB by boosting its funding of the Asian Development
Bank.
These geopolitical moves by China reveal the wider point that the geopol-
itical and geo-economic are inseparable (Cowen and Smith, 2009). For ex-
ample, Chinese infrastructure projects might combine elements of grants,
concessional loans and commercial lending, with the condition that con-
struction contracts go to Chinese SOEs. Infrastructure is a key focus for
China and brings together the ideas, practices and technologies that Branch
(2017) sees as constituting territory. Ougaard (2018) views the ‘infrastruc-
ture push’ among G20 countries as part of the need to absorb surplus cap-
ital and, by so doing, reduce the costs of increasingly global transacting.
As such, things like the BRI and AIIB are part of this wider ‘push’. With
regard to China’s international strategy, Bach (2016) describes it as hav-
ing an ‘infrastructural foreign policy’ in which ‘[t]he visibility of Chinese
infrastructure financing is central to its global image’. But infrastructure in-
vestment is also a spatial fix for Chinese capitalism, by generating overseas
markets in sectors where the large construction SOEs (Brill and Reboredo,
2019) face diminishing returns domestically while resource-seeking deals
are often tied into infrastructure contracts. Thus, focusing on infrastructure
necessarily involves other sectors and investments.
THE TANGLING AND TWISTING OF CHINA’S TERRITORIAL FORMS
The BRI is the flagship of China’s internationalization push and can, at one
level, be seen as a ‘grand strategy’ which is part of the country’s wider
global aspirations (Narins and Agnew, 2019). Authors have pointed to the
twin movements that tie Chinese nation building, territory and development
together (Grant, 2018; Lin et al., 2019; Yeh and Wharton, 2016). One is a
national project to integrate the country, particularly connecting and devel-
oping the western regions which were de-prioritized in the reform period
when investment was targeted at the eastern coastal regions. The other is
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a ‘civilizational’ vision (Woon, 2019) that seeks to project Chinese state
power outwards. Xi Jinping’s vision echoes earlier European framings of
the ‘Silk Road’ which would link Europe to the East by traversing the
relatively ‘uncivilized’ central Asian region (Mueller, 2019). The under-
pinning rationale is based on the ‘development–security nexus promoting
infrastructure construction as the main booster of economic growth which
is in turn perceived as necessary for peace and stability’ (Benabdallah,
2019: 99). The two movements are linked in that both aim to enhance
China’s connectivity through transportation and communication infrastruc-
ture (Wiig and Silver, 2019), and in that the BRI has evolved out of ap-
proaches used within China’s borders (Grant, 2018). Indeed, this genesis of
the BRI means that despite its appearance as a grand strategy it is rather
more piecemeal and emergent than official proclamations might suggest.
Jones and Zeng (2019) usefully argue that in practice the BRI is a loose
policy ‘envelope’ whose ‘fuzziness’ is its strength. Spatially, this fuzziness
is captured in the purposive failure to develop an official map of the BRI
(Lin et al., 2019) which gives policy makers the leeway to adapt the so-
called strategy as macroeconomic, geopolitical and local conditions change.
In Sassen’s (2018) framing, territory is created across national borders but
is not formalized beyond these loose policy proclamations and high-level
summits.
The policies and drivers that inhabit the BRI ‘envelope’ are numerous.
Benabdallah (2019) sees the BRI as a way of pushing new norms and prac-
tices on relatively weak states in Central Asia and parts of East Asia and
Africa, while also clearly opposing the US’s containment strategy for China.
None of the new multilateral organizations are Western-centred, enabling
China to set the rules using a ‘South–South’ rhetoric to build commonality.
Likewise, China is keen to internationalize the renminbi and is using the
financing tied to the BRI to do this and to extend some of its e-commerce
platforms (Narins and Agnew, 2019). Finally, China’s western regions are
under-developed compared to the coastal areas and so the BRI is a vehicle
for extending infrastructure into these poorly served but politically volatile
regions (Klinger and Muldavin, 2019). The malleability of the BRI is ne-
cessary because in practice it is largely a retrospective rationalization of a
number of previously unconnected projects across Southeast Asia, Central
Asia, Eastern Europe and East Africa. As such it is evolving on a project-
by-project basis, and therefore enrols other states in bilateral relations. In-
dividual projects often legitimize their value by evoking the BRI although,
in practice, success requires elite commitments that are tied to the wider de-
velopment strategies of both China and the recipient state. Where such com-
mitments are lacking, as illustrated in Brill and Reboredo’s (2019) study of
the Modderfontein new city in South Africa, then infrastructure projects are
more likely to fail.
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Bilateral Relations and Beyond
This discussion of elite commitments to projects opens up questions around
the relations between the Chinese state and other states of the global South.
Invariably photographs appear of handshakes between the Chinese Presi-
dent and the leader of the (global South) state in which a project is being
delivered, against a backdrop of the two countries’ flags. All the symbolism
speaks of state-to-state brokerage. Such relations are constituted through
familiar modalities including Memoranda of Understanding, framework
agreements, concessional and/or commercial loans, trade deals, or grants.
The legitimatory discourses of these relationships are, as we know, cen-
tred on ‘win–win’ outcomes and ‘South–South’ development. As Grovogui
(2011) argues, the assumed ‘moral equivalence’ of fellow Southern nations
is based on shared histories of colonization, which often conceal power
asymmetries between the countries. Crucially, part of the rationale for such
deals is for the recipient state to recognize the territorial integrity of China
by denying Taiwan’s sovereign claims (Miller, 2017).
Yet this is a relational politics in which the agency of the global South
state (and occasionally civil society) is important (Kragelund and Carmody,
2016). Indeed, ‘the state’ on each side of the bilateral relationship is far
from homogeneous or static. Even the ‘classic’ bilateral model of bundled
concessional financing deals (Brautigam, 2011) brings together a range of
major state players on the Chinese side, including the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Com-
merce (MOFCOM), SOEs and state development banks. Jones and Zeng
(2019) have argued for a more nuanced understanding based on the idea
of state transformation. Transformation relates to the Chinese state around
processes of fragmentation, decentralization and internationalization. Frag-
mentation refers to piecemeal reforms of party-state apparatuses which cre-
ate multiple and overlapping agencies; decentralization relates to empow-
erment of provincial level actors; while internationalization is where for-
merly national actors begin to operate beyond China’s borders. The out-
come is that ‘China’s top leaders must now bargain with, accommodate
and coordinate a sometimes-unruly multitude of actors’ (Jones and Zeng,
2019: 1417). Central authority is not absent but is exercised through cadre
appointments and discretionary government control, implying that govern-
ing a ‘grand strategy’ like the BRI is impossible. As such, the ‘omni-
channel politics’ is not so much a coherent multi-level governance approach
but a much more emergent and messier attempt to govern across space
(Jessop, 2016).
A linked way in which we need to move beyond a view of coherent
states is a focus on elites located in different parts of the state. Despite the
discourses of ‘South–South’ equivalence, such bilateral relations are often
based on inter-elite bargains (Carmody et al., 2009). Klinger and Muldavin
(2019) argue that much of the bilateralism is symbolic insofar as, while
12 Giles Mohan
deals are publicized through high-level handshakes, the implementation of
projects is through local and transnational actors. Echoing Hart, they go
on to argue: ‘The key is to be attentive to the distinct configuration of ac-
tors and scales when investigating the relationship between uneven devel-
opment in China … and China’s global integration, rather than proceeding
with an a priori notion of states and interests’ (Klinger and Muldavin, 2019:
6). Often these deals are brokered through some form of parallel govern-
ment, which compromises their transparency and accountability, effectively
putting them outside of democratic control. In Angola, Corkin (2013) has
analysed the ring-fenced institutions that were created to manage Chinese
loans which allowed President Dos Santos and his coterie to direct these
investments. From the Chinese perspective, these enclaves within but also
outside of the Angolan state are about controlling risk, whereby dealing di-
rectly with key elites and power brokers reduces the risk of finance passing
though state treasuries, or of opposition stifling project implementation. In
the oil sector, as Moreira (2013) documents, the initial forays by China into
global South producer countries were based on inter-elite relations, but as
deals failed and it became clear that political risks were poorly accounted
for the Chinese oil companies moved into joint ventures as a means of
assuaging risk.
Focusing on the specificities of actors, interests and practices reveals mul-
tiple types of economic agents including the large SOEs that are not cotermi-
nous with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), provincial SOEs and multi-
ple forms of private capital. While the main winners from Chinese interna-
tionalization may be the SOEs, particularly those in construction (Jones and
Zeng, 2019), there have been many failed projects, which speak of some-
what reckless investment decisions on the side of Chinese firms coupled
with unstable operating environments in the global South. Moreover, much
of the discussion of disaggregating the state rests on complexifying the Chi-
nese state, whereas the relationality of projects and deals means elite-based
political settlements on the global South side are equally important (Hickey
et al., 2015). While these elite actors ‘design’ territories to serve changing
ideas and interests (Atzili and Kadercan, 2017), everyday interactions or
subaltern resistance can circumvent these territorial designs (Wiig and Sil-
ver, 2019). Where much of this localized interaction takes place is around
the porous boundaries of specific projects, which may appear enclaved but
in practice are transgressed in numerous ways.
Enclaves as Networked Territories
Another way in which scholars have sought to understand the spatial pol-
itics of Chinese engagement is through enclaves (Mohan, 2013; Sidaway,
2007). As territories, these enclaves are far from uniform and echo the com-
plex dynamics already identified in this article; they reflect the interests of
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a range of actors, are designed for different purposes, may be more or less
formalized, can have relatively hard or relatively porous borders, and may be
subnational, but equally can cut across national borders. Such enclaves in-
clude Special Economic Zones (SEZs), turnkey construction projects, Chi-
natowns, edge cities and natural resource concessions (Tu Huynh, 2018).
While enclave thinking has long roots (see, e.g., Hirschmann, 1958) it was
revived by Ferguson’s (2005) discussion of African resource investment,
which he argued ‘has been concentrated in secured enclaves, often with little
or no economic benefit to the wider society’ (ibid.: 378). Ferguson explicitly
linked these forms of territory to wider processes of capitalist accumulation
insofar as these enclaves constitute ‘lily pads’ that are connected through
production chains and so entrench uneven forms of development while be-
ing ‘noteworthy for their ability to bypass the nation-state frame altogether’
(ibid.: 379). In this sense enclaves are both locally territorialized and linked
to wider networked relationships.
What the focus on enclaved forms of territory brings is a greater aware-
ness of the multiplicity of actors engaged in the construction of territory,
but also how these infrastructure nodes aimed at capturing value become
embedded in multiple other social, political and economic logics. For ex-
ample, SEZs became widespread in China as part of its own export-driven
industrialization and are now being set up in Africa and elsewhere (Brill
and Reboredo, 2019; Giannecchini and Taylor, 2018; Oya, 2018). As forms
of territory these zones have been treated as ‘spaces of exception’ (Arnold,
2012) where different — often draconian — rules apply and through which
‘variegated sovereignty’ (Ong, 2006) is exercised. While Ferguson’s analysis
of enclaves acknowledges the transnational, capitalist connections of these
spaces, he underplays the ways in which state space and enclaves work to-
gether. Foreshadowing Sassen (2018), Easterling (2016) posits the idea of
‘infrastructure space’ as a site of ‘multiple, overlapping or nested forms of
sovereignty, where domestic and transnational jurisdictions collide, infra-
structure space becomes a medium of what might be called extrastatecraft
— a portmanteau describing the often undisclosed activities outside of, in
addition to, and sometimes even in partnership with statecraft’ (ibid.: 15,
original emphasis). For Easterling, then, statecraft and extrastatecraft in the
form of things like SEZs can work together rather than being ‘lily pads’
unconnected to national state spaces.
This discussion of territory and development suggests that we need to
keep in focus the connections that geopolitical and geo-economic processes
bring, but that such connections are realized in particular places with their
own forms of formal and informal territorialization. Focusing on individual
Chinese-backed projects allows us to apprehend the range of actors, inter-
ests and practices at work and how infrastructure acts as one technology
for binding such relations together in and across space. To illustrate this, I
outline a case from Ghana’s oil and gas sector.
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CHINESE OIL COMPANIES AND GHANA’S DEVELOPMENT
China’s global engagement with oil builds on its domestic experiences
with oil production. The history of Chinese oil companies is beyond the
scope of this article but goes back to a range of ministerial reforms and
restructurings over the 1990s (Taylor, 2014) which saw the creation of
three large national oil companies (NOCs) — Sinopec, China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and China National Petroleum Cor-
poration (CNPC). In terms of Jones and Zeng’s (2019) framing of ‘state
transformation’ these NOCs were partially privatized so that commercial
pressures began to outweigh geopolitical ones, particularly around energy
security (Obi, 2019). For example, CNPC’s entry into Sudan in the mid-
1990s was driven by the company rather than any geopolitical directive from
Beijing (Patey, 2014).
It was only from the early to mid-1990s, when China’s domestic oil sup-
plies could no longer meet demand, that oil imports increased and its NOCs
began searching for investment and supply opportunities overseas, mainly
in the Middle East and Central Asia, but also Africa. Chinese NOCs en-
tered the international oil sector that was already dominated by Western
international oil companies (IOCs) and so was forced to purchase small and
fragmented stakes in existing fields or invest in riskier regions (Chalmers
and Mocker, 2017). There was also some evidence that these Chinese oil
companies overpaid for these assets given that there were few available to
purchase (Downs, 2007). Those fields that they can more easily access —
notably Sudan in the early 2000s — were off limits to Western investors
due to sanctions (Large, 2009). It is this lack of opportunities that has of-
ten driven Chinese investment decisions rather than a proclivity for Chinese
firms to invest in dictatorships as more hawkish accounts argue.
In securing overseas deals, Moreira (2013) focuses on the role of elites in
brokerage. She argues that historically Chinese firms have preferred working
directly with state elites, but that the risks of this model (e.g. changes in lead-
ership, etc.) are seeing shifts towards joint ventures by Chinese NOCs with
African NOCs and/or IOCs (Obi, 2019). In addition to mergers and acqui-
sitions, Chinese NOCs and SOEs have entered into resource swaps. The so-
called ‘Angola mode’ of infrastructure financing (Power et al., 2012) — an
arrangement where oil is bartered for low-interest loans — while overblown
in its significance for Africa, is tightly controlled since the finance never
leaves China, despite the client nominally being the recipient country. In
these closed tendering arrangements China’s MOFCOM approves the con-
tractor and then the finances provided by the Chinese development bank
pass to the Chinese SOE once the African ‘client’ has approved their release
(Brautigam, 2011).
In Ghana a gas processing plant was built in the country’s Western Region
between 2011 and 2015, which reflected a resource-seeking and market-
seeking logic on the part of the Chinese NOC Sinopec. The case reveals
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how relatively enclaved infrastructure spaces — oils rigs and major produc-
tion facilities — are connected to wider political processes and embedded
in particular local political economies. The relations are not only entwined
with domestic elite politics in Ghana, but also already entering into spaces
inhabited by theWorld Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), which
have hitherto played a major role in Ghana’s economy and polity.
Early attempts by CNOOC to buy stakes in a newly discovered field fell
through (Phillips, 2019) but in parallel Sinopec was negotiating an oil-for-
infrastructure deal. That two Chinese oil companies were competing with
one another for stakes in Ghana’s oil suggests that there is no singular state-
led initiative by the Chinese around securing African resources. The gas
plant in question treats raw gas from the offshore Jubilee Field in order to
produce fuel-grade gas for the Aboadze power station. The spatiality of this
project is complex. The pipeline bringing gas onshore reveals the intercon-
nectedness of infrastructures and how a quintessentially enclaved produc-
tion facility, the offshore rig, links to material and political processes (Ap-
pel, 2012) in both fixed state territories (electricity production and sales, tax
revenue, etc.) but also in transnational networks (Chinese oil companies and
supply chains, Chinese banks, etc.).
Since oil production started in November 2010, just three years after
proven commercial reserves were found, the Jubilee Field has experienced
difficulties and produces an average of 100,000 barrels per day (bpd). There
are currently 17 active contract areas in upstream operations and 20 discov-
eries made since 2007. Most of the 20 discoveries are still being appraised
but two new ones are being developed — the Tweneboa-Enyenra-Ntomme
(TEN) and Sankofa Gye-Nyame. TEN began production at the end of 2016
and is projected to produce 80,000 bpd. The Sankofa Gye-Nyame field is
expected to produce 45,000 bpd of oil at its peak and began production in
2017. The three fields come with associated and non-associated gas, which
is critical to reducing the cost of fuelling power plants to ensure stable and
reliable electricity.
On the back of the oil discovery in 2007, the Government of Ghana began
a series of negotiations with Asian infrastructure providers for some sort
of resources for equity arrangement. The Korean construction firm STX
got quite far with a US$ 10 billion loan for housing construction before
it was held up indefinitely for ‘technical reasons’. In mid-September 2010
the China Development Bank offered the Ghana government a US$ 3 bil-
lionMaster Facility Agreement (MFA) on a non-concessional basis (Hardus,
2017). This loan facility was dedicated to the Western Corridor Gas Infra-
structure Development Project comprising 12 subprojects. The loan was
split into two equal tranches of US$ 1.5 billion and was to be paid at
LIBOR1 plus 2.95 per cent with an upfront fee of 0.25 per cent and
1. LIBOR — London Interbank Offered Rate — is a benchmark interest rate at which major
global banks lend to one another.
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commitment fees of 1 per cent per year. Sinopec won the contract for the
gas processing plant while repayment is through UNIPEC Asia, which is
a wholly owned subsidiary of Sinopec. UNIPEC acquired an ‘off-taker’
agreement to lift Ghana’s share of crude from the Jubilee Field, amounting
to 13,000 barrels of crude oil daily for fifteen-and-a-half years to pay for the
US$ 3 billion loan. John Mahama, the then Vice-President (later President)
of Ghana, spoke of the deal: ‘China has emerged as a significant source of
credit to Africa, traditionally our partners have been the World Bank and
IMF …. The process of accessing World Bank and IMF credit has been un-
fortunately quite tiresome and comes with a lot of strings…we find it easier
to go to the BRIC countries’ (quoted in Bloomberg, 2012).
The deal was seen to be one-sided, with UNIPEC getting assured supplies
while no commitments were asked of the Chinese partners. The Chinese ar-
gue that such a system is able to deliver projects quickly which certainly
seems to be true, and is one reason why this form of project funding and
delivery is preferred by recipient leaders who often have an eye on political
longevity. TheWorld Bank was also negotiating for a loan to develop the gas
infrastructure, but as Chen (2016: 2) notes in the context of the contract of-
fered to Sinopec, it ‘provided the Ghanaians with an easy all-inclusive deal
that obviated the need to conduct laborious and independent stages of ten-
dering and financing negotiations’ (see also Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2019).
The collateralization of oil to finance infrastructure inevitably became en-
tangled with domestic Ghanaian politics. In Ghana, two main parties vie for
elections and have held power between them since the return to multi-party
democracy in 1992. They are the National Democratic Congress (NDC)
which professes to be social democratic and more statist in its thinking,
and the more market-oriented New Patriotic Party (NPP) — although the
ideological divisions between them are not huge. Shortly after oil was dis-
covered the NDC promised to use the oil resources to develop fertilizer and
Liquefied Petroleum Gas cylinder industries, as part of a long-term develop-
ment plan. Around the same time the government began drafting new oil and
gas legislation, notably the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA),
which sought to establish how oil revenues would be used for national de-
velopment (Mohan et al., 2018). When it came to the design of the PRMA,
the NDC favoured immediate extraction of oil rents to finance rapid de-
velopment as opposed to saving for the future. Clause 5 of the Petroleum
Revenue Management Bill — the draft of the final act — prohibited the use
of the Petroleum Holding Fund as ‘collateral for debts, guarantees, commit-
ments or other liabilities of any other entities’. But once the bill reached
Parliament, an NDC member of parliament proposed an amendment to al-
low for collateralization. The proposed amendment received overwhelming
support from ruling NDC MPs, and the debates that ensued followed strict
party lines. The issue was eventually put to a vote, which gave the ruling
NDC the green light to use future revenues from oil as collateral in access-
ing loans.
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At one level such behaviour by the NDC was less about a vision for de-
velopment and more about the short-term need to secure an election victory.
Financing infrastructure is a powerful way of demonstrating political com-
mitment to an electorate (Mohan et al., 2018) but also a tool to spread
patronage resources to party-linked capitalists who secure subcontracts
(ACEP, 2013). While such short-termist political incentives certainly played
a role in these debates, contestations over how oil revenues should be man-
aged were also at play. Supporting the view that Clause 5 be amended to
enable oil-backed loans, ruling NDC MPs pointed to infrastructural deficits
and inadequate social services as justification for the need to collateralize
oil resources. The NPP opposed the collateralization of future oil revenues,
seeing it as ‘nothing more than eating your dinner and lunch at breakfast
time’.2 As the debates continued, the NPP opposition began to soften its
stance which opened the door for oil-backed loans meant primarily for in-
frastructural development. Playing into this were wider negotiations around
sovereign debt in which the IMF raised the ceiling for Ghana’s international
loans to enable the Chinese loan agreement (Odoom, 2017).
The decision to work with Chinese banks and China’s NOCs was less
about some ‘socialist’ affinity between the NDC and ‘Communist’ China
and more to do with the willingness of the Chinese to offer an oil for in-
frastructure loan, which the NDC used for development of its domestic gas
industry. However, the MFA loan ran into difficulties. Over the summer of
2014 it was announced that only half the loan would be used (Tranche B),
and of the 12 projects only two went ahead. It transpired that the issue was
the price of oil that was agreed to pay the loan. The Government of Ghana
estimated it would end up paying US$ 6.4 billion for the US$ 3 billion loan
while 60 per cent or more of the contracts go to Chinese companies. In Au-
gust 2014 President Mahama visited Beijing, cap in hand, to renegotiate: the
Chinese remained intransigent (Citifmonline, 2014). In December 2016 the
negotiations were re-opened, this time using sales of gas to finance the loan
although final details were never resolved and nothing more was heard of it
(Citifmonline, 2016). However, a new deal has been mooted around Ghana’s
bauxite reserves by Chinese SOE Sinohydro, which had earlier built a large
dam in the north of the country as part of a concessional loan arrangement
(Foreign Policy, 2020).
CONCLUSION
I have argued that China’s rise as a development actor is being organized
through twisted and overlapping territories. These emergent political prac-
tices and processes are not as coherent as the idea of ‘omni-channel politics’
2. Parliamentary Hansard, 9 December 2010, Col 2820.
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suggests since they are constituted from both formal and informal prac-
tices, some working through existing political structures and others through
newly created ones or even clandestine channels. This multiplicity of terri-
torial strategies is necessary given that China is seeking to both align with
and change the existing geopolitical structures while also creating markets
for Chinese goods and services. Lots of work is going into this territory
making that is material, political and ideological. Crucially, despite work-
ing through different scales and across networks, the Chinese state and the
regimes of other countries remain central to these forms of territory. The
key is how state power works in consort with informal political and geo-
economic structures and how these are organized in networked and enclaved
ways.
This territorialization excites geopolitical rivalry, particularly with the US
but also some Asian and European countries. Recently it has been contested
by countries like Malaysia and Sri Lanka that have withdrawn from further
Chinese loan agreements due to mounting and onerous debt levels (Yamada
and Palma, 2018). There is a sense that through the BRI China may have
over-extended itself and mis-read some of the domestic politics it engages
with. These government rebuttals as well as civil society protest have sent
out warning signs, making it likely that Chinese firms will behave more like
Western investors (Chalmers and Mocker, 2017).
China is now an increasingly transnational player (Klinger and Muldavin,
2019). This means that we are all implicated and, as I have argued, it moves
the locus of development (studies) away from a North–South axis to more
diffuse and complex relations of connectedness — but ones that are still
racialized, power-laden and linked to the development of capitalism. As
scholars seeking to ‘do’ such connected research and to theorize its mean-
ings and implications, we need more than ever to develop ontologies and to
embrace methods that tease out interwoven histories and geographies. These
ontologies, such as that of multiple territories elaborated here, do not aban-
don concepts such as peripherality (Fischer, 2015) or uneven development,
but do unpack them at finer-grained spatial scales. In turn these complex
connections mean we cannot easily argue that China’s rise is a ‘good’ or
‘bad’ thing for the rest of the globe but must recognize that it varies by
project and place.
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